Dynamic discrete-time multi-leader–follower games with leaders in turn  by Nie, Pu-yan
Computers and Mathematics with Applications 61 (2011) 2039–2043
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Computers and Mathematics with Applications
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/camwa
Dynamic discrete-time multi-leader–follower games with leaders
in turn
Pu-yan Nie
Institute of Industrial Economics, Jinan University, Guangzhou, 510632, PR China
a r t i c l e i n f o
Keywords:
Stackelberg games
Multi-leader–follower game
Game theory
a b s t r a c t
In many social phenomena, there exist multiple leaders and followers, and, positions
of leaders and followers vary at each stage. Based on dynamic Stackelberg games with
leaders in turn, this paper develops and characterizes discrete-time dynamic multi-
leader–follower games with leaders in turn. To simplify the problem, all players in this
game are divided into some fixed groups and all groups act as leaders in turn. A dynamic
programming algorithm is employed to solve this model under feedback information
structure.
© 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Many social and economic phenomena are always described asmulti-level games or hierarchy decisions. In amulti-level
game, players make decisions at different levels with different goals. Players often cannot act independently of each other
but have to take into account other players’ strategies. In two-level cases (Stackelberg game), optimal strategies chosen by
lower level players (followers), heavily depend on strategies employed by upper level players (leaders). Leaders make their
decisions by fully estimating followers’ rational reactions, assuming that all players optimize their objective functions. This
is a static multi-leader–follower model which was initially explored by Pang and Fukushima [1] and a dynamic version was
recently introduced [2].
Dynamic two-level optimization problems were initially discussed by Chen and Cruz [3] and subsequently highlighted
by many interesting papers [2,4,5]. Research on dynamic games seems challenging and two-level games were successfully
utilized inmany fields, for example, in biology field recently [6] and in economics [7]. Dynamic gameswere utilized tomodel
firm’s price in the long term and some interesting results were derived in the economic field [7].
In all extant literature about dynamic Stackelberg games, positions of both leader(s) and followers are assumed to be
fixed during a game. But in many practical games, leaders may change at each step. Models without fixed leader(s) were
firstly brought forward by Nie [5]. This article extends the problem in [5] to multi-leader–follower situations. The following
example in economics illustrates these problems.
Example 1.1 (Overconfident Consumers [8]). A significant body of experimental evidence shows that individuals are
overconfident about the precision of their own predictions, which makes it difficult in many products, for example, cellular
phone customers. To model overconfident consumers, Grubb established a two-stage game theory model. At the first stage,
the firm offers a tariff menu and the consumers accept or reject. It is a principal-agent game or a Stackelberg game, in
which firms play leading positions while consumers act as followers. At the second stage, consumers learn their private
information, purchase quantity and pay bill. At this stage, consumers play leading positions while firms act as followers.
Actually, these phenomena are very popular in the society. In the long run, consumers and firms play a leading position in
turn. This paper focuses on a dynamic multi-leader–follower game and the leaders are not fixed in this game. To simplify
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the problem, we assume that all players are divided into several groups and these groups act as leaders in turn. We formally
define this problem in this paper.
Definition 1.2. In a game, players are divided into several groups labeled 1, 2, . . . , K and groups act as leaders in turn.
Namely, group i acts as leader at some stage and group (i + 1) will act as leader at the subsequent stage. Especially, when
group K acts as leader at some stage, the first group will act as the leader at the subsequent stage. This game is a dynamic
multi-leader–follower one with leaders in turn.
This paper stipulates that all players are fully rational, and, objective functions, state variables and control variables of all
players are all known by each player. This paper is organized as follows:model of dynamicmulti-leader–follower gamewith
leaders in turn is established in Section 2. Dynamic programming algorithm is developed for feedback information structure
in Section 3. Some remarks are presented in Section 4.
2. The model
The model is established as follows. There are N = ∑Kκ=1 Nκ players in total, consisting in K groups with Nκ players
in group κ for κ = 1, 2, . . . , K . K groups act as leaders in turn. Discrete-time dynamic multi-leader–follower game with
leaders in turn, is formally stated. The discrete time periods are t = 1, 2, . . . , T .
The variables involved in this problem are represented as follows: vectors xκ,νt ∈ Xκ,ν ⊂ Rmκ,ν denote the state of the
player at time t = 1, 2, . . . , T of the νth player in group κ , where κ = 1, 2, . . . , K , ν = 1, 2, . . . ,Nκ .mκ,ν is the dimension
of the strategy of the νth player in group κ .
We stipulateΠκ,νt (x
κ,ν
t ) := {uκ,νt |hκ,νt (xκ,νt , uκ,νt ) ≤ 0}, where hκ,νt is some given function for all t and κ, ν. Vectors uκ,νt ∈
Π
κ,ν
t (x
κ,ν
t ) ⊂ Rnκ,ν denote the decision variables for the player at time t = 1, 2, . . . , T − 1 where κ = 1, 2, . . . , K , ν = 1,
2, . . . ,Nκ .
uκ,ν := (uκ,ν1 , uκ,ν2 , . . . , uκ,νT−1), xκ,ν := (xκ,ν1 , xκ,ν2 , . . . , xκ,νT ), κ = 1, 2, . . . , K , ν = 1, 2, . . . ,Nκ .
The state variables {xκ,νt }Tt=1 are always governed by the system of state transition equations
xκ,νt+1 = F κ,νt (xκ,νt , uκ,νt ), t = 1, 2, . . . , T − 1, κ = 1, 2, . . . , K , ν = 1, 2, . . . ,Nκ (2.1)
with the initial states of the players xκ,ν1 . (2.1) suggests feedback information structure.
The set of admissible decisions of the player κ in the group is represented by
Πκ,ν(xκ,ν) := {uκ,ν |hκ,νt (xκ,νt , uκ,νt ) ≤ 0, t = 1, 2, . . . , T − 1}.
For convenience, we will use the following notations for κ = 1, 2, . . . , K and ν = 1, 2, . . . ,Nκ :
xκ,νt,T−1 := (xκ,νt , . . . , xκ,νT−1), uκ,νt,T−1 := (uκ,νt , . . . , uκ,νT−1),
u−κ,νt := (u1,1t , . . . , u1,N
1
t , . . . , u
κ,1
t , u
κ,2
t , . . . , u
κ,ν−1
t , u
κ,ν+1
t , . . . , u
κ,Nκ
t , . . . , u
K ,1
t , . . . , u
K ,NK
t ),
x−κ,νt := (x1,1t , . . . , x1,N
1
t , . . . , x
κ,1
t , x
κ,2
t , . . . , x
κ,ν−1
t , x
κ,ν+1
t , . . . , x
κ,Nκ
t , . . . , x
K ,1
t , . . . , x
K ,NK
t ),
uκ,ν := (uκ,ν1 , uκ,ν2 , . . . , uκ,νT−1), u−κ,ν := (u−κ,ν1 , u−κ,ν2 , . . . , u−κ,νT−1 ), uκt := (uκ,1t , uκ,2t , . . . , uκ,N
κ
t ),
ut := (uκ,νt , u−κ,νt ), u−κt := (u1t , u2t , . . . , uκ−1t , uκ+1t , . . . , uKt ), xt := (xκ,νt , x−κ,νt ),
xκt := (xκ,1t , uκ,2t , . . . , xκ,N
κ
t ), x
−κ
t := (x1t , u2t , . . . , xκ−1t , xκ+1t , . . . , xKt ),
F κt := (F κ,1t , F κ,2t , . . . , F κ,N
κ
t ), Ft := (F 1t , F 2t , . . . , FKt ) = (F κt , F−κt ),
Π
κ,ν
t,T−1(x
κ,ν
t,T−1) := {uκ,νt,T−1|hκ,ντ (xκ,ντ , uκ,ντ ) ≤ 0, τ = t, t + 1, . . . , T − 1}.
For t = 1, 2, . . . , T − 1, Gκ,νt is the cost function and the total cost function Jκ,νt , from the stage t to T , is defined
as Jκ,νt (xt , ut,T−1) = Gκ,νT (xT ) +
∑T−1
τ=t Gκ,ντ (xτ , uτ ), where {xt}Tt=2 are determined by (2.1). Given the initial state x0, if
t ≡ κ (mod K)where 1 ≤ κ ≤ K (we call t ≡ κ (mod K) if and only if there exists a positive integer i such that t = κ+Ki),
then, we have P¯T−t(xt), which is defined as follows: for ν = 1, 2, . . . ,Nκ and t = 1, 2, . . . , T − 2,
min
uκ,νt
Jκ,νt (xt , ut,T−1) = Gκ,νt (xt , ut)+ Jκ,νt+1(xt+1, ut+1,T−1)
s.t. uι,ςt ∈ argmin{J ι,ςt (xt , ut,T−1) = Gι,ςt (xt , ut)+ J ι,ςt+1(xt+1, ut+1,T−1)},
uκ,νt,T−1 ∈ Πκ,νt,T−1(xκ,νt,T−1), uι,ςt,T−1 ∈ Π ι,ςt,T−1(xι,ςt,T−1),
ι ≠ κ, ς = 1, 2, . . . ,N ι, ut+1,T−1 solves P¯T−t−1(xt+1).
(2.2)
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For t = T − 1 and ν = 1, 2, . . . ,Nκ , problem P¯1(xT−1) is defined as follows
min
uκ,νT−1
Jκ,νT−1(xT−1, uT−1) = Gκ,νT−1(xT−1, uT−1)+ Gκ,νT (xT )
s.t. uι,ςT−1 ∈ argmin{J ι,ςT−1(xT−1, uT−1) = Gι,ςT−1(xT−1, uT−1)+ Gι,ςT (xT )},
uκ,νT−1 ∈ Πκ,νT−1(xκ,νT−1), uι,ςT−1 ∈ Π ι,ςT−1(xι,ςT−1),
ι ≠ κ, ς = 1, 2, . . . ,N ι,
(2.3)
where T − 1 ≡ κ (mod K). We point out that P¯T−t−1(xt+1) = P¯T−t−1(Ft(xt , ut)) and the subproblem P¯T−t−1(xt+1) is jointly
determined by xt and ut .
From the transition equation, the above problem is feedback information structure. In the feedback information structure,
state and decision at the current stage jointly determine the state at the subsequent stage. If this reformulation is related to
the information of early stages (the initial stage), it is a close-loop (open-loop) dynamic multi-leader–follower game with
leaders in turn. We refer to the problem P¯T−1(x1) as a dynamic multi-leader–follower optimization problemwith leaders in
turn or DMLFLT for short. We point out that this model with two stages appeared in [8] in economics and the model in this
paper is more general than that in [8]. The above model is an extension of [5], which combines the multi-leader–follower
version [2].
3. Dynamic programming algorithm for feedback DMLFLT
This section develops a dynamic programming algorithm for DMLFLT P¯T−1(x1) under feedback information structure,
based on the principle of optimality stated in the following theorem. Recall that, for group κ , (uκ,⋆1 , u
κ,⋆
2 , . . . , u
κ,⋆
T−1) is called
a Nash equilibrium (NE) corresponding to (x1, u−κ,⋆) if and only if, for given (x1, u−κ,⋆),
Jκ,ν(x1, u⋆) ≤ Jκ,ν(x1, uκ,ν, u−κ,ν,⋆) (3.1)
for any uκ,ν ∈ Πκ,ν(xκ,ν), κ = 1, 2, . . . , K and the corresponding ν = 1, 2, . . . ,Nκ .
For each t = 1, 2, . . . , T − 1, consider subproblem (2.2) with the initial given state xt , and {xτ }Tτ=t are determined by
(2.1). This problem is also referred to as Pκ,νT−t(xt) for ν = 1, 2, . . . ,Nκ . Furthermore, this paper stipulates that there always
exist solutions to all subproblems.
Proposition 3.1. Let (u⋆1, u
⋆
2, . . . , u
⋆
T−1) constitute an optimal policy for DMLFLT P¯T−1(x1) with corresponding optimal
trajectories (x1, x⋆2, . . . , x
⋆
T ). Consider the subproblem P¯T−t(x⋆t ) for every t = 1, 2, . . . , T − 1 with the initial state x⋆t . Then,
the truncated policy {(u⋆t , u⋆t+1, . . . , u⋆T−1)} is optimal for the subproblem P¯T−t(x⋆t ).
Proof. We prove this result by induction in t . Obviously, the results hold for t = 1, i.e., the problem P1T−1(x⋆1). Assume that
this result holds for P¯T−1(x⋆1), . . . , P¯T−tˆ+1(x
⋆
tˆ−1). We testify this conclusion for t = tˆ .
To prove the conclusions by contradiction, suppose that {(u⋆
tˆ
, u⋆
tˆ+1, . . . , u
⋆
T−1)} is not an optimal solution to the
subproblem P¯T−tˆ(x⋆tˆ ). From the subproblem P¯T−tˆ+1(x
⋆
tˆ−1), we then know that {(u⋆tˆ−1, u⋆tˆ , . . . , u⋆T−1)} is not an optimal
solution to the subproblem P¯T−tˆ+1(x⋆tˆ−1). It contradicts the hypothesis of t = tˆ − 1 and the result holds for t = tˆ . The
result is achieved for all t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1 and the proof is complete. 
The principle of optimality in Proposition 3.1 indicates that an optimal policy of DMLFLT can be constructed in a piecemeal
manner. First, optimal policies are found for subproblems involving only the last stage. Then, utilizing these results, we
obtain optimal policies for the last two stages. We repeat this procedure step by step backward until an optimal policy for
the entire problem is constructed. V κ,νT−t(xt , yt) denote the optimal value function for all κ and the corresponding ν. The
dynamic programming algorithm is presented.
Algorithm 3.2 (Dynamic Programming Algorithm for DMLFLT). Step 1: Set t := T and let for each (xT , yT ) ∈ X× Y and the
corresponding κ
V κ,ν0 (xT , yT ) := Gκ,νT (xT , yT ), κ = 1, 2, . . . , K , ν = 1, 2, . . . ,Nκ .
Step 2: Set t := t − 1 and solve the following problems for each (xt , yt) ∈ X× Y and the corresponding κ
min
uκ,νt ∈Πκ,νt (xκ,νt )
{Gκ,νt (xt , uκt , u−κt (xt , uκt ))+ V κ,νT−t−1(F κt (xκt , uκt ), F−κt (x−κt , u−κt (xt , uκt )))}, (3.2)
where uκt , u
−κ
t (xt , uκt ) comprises solutions of the lower level problems
min
uι,ςt ∈Π ι,ςt (xι,ςt )
Gι,ςt (xt , ut)+ V ι,ςT−t−1(Ft(xt , ut)), (3.3)
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where ι = 1, 2, κ−1, κ+1, . . . , K and ς = 1, 2, . . . ,N ι. Let uκ,⋆t (xt) be the optimal solution to (3.3) and u−κ⋆t (xt , uκ⋆t ) be an
optimal solution of (3.2). uκ,⋆t (xt) := uκt (xt , u−κt (xt , uκt )) be the optimal solution to (3.3). Denote u⋆t := (uκ,⋆t (xt), u−κ,⋆t (xt)).
Let V κ,νT−t(xt) and Vˆ
ι,ς
T−t(xt , u⋆t (xt)) denote the optimal values of problems (3.2) and (3.3), respectively. Define V
ι,ς
T−t(xt) by
V ι,ςT−t(xt) := Vˆ ι,ςT−t(xt , u⋆t (xt)).
Step 3: If t = 1, a solution to DMLFLT P¯T−1(x1) under feedback information structure is obtained, then stop. Otherwise,
go to Step 2.
Apparently, the optimal value function V κ,νT−t(xt , yt) depends on V
κ,ν
T−t−1(xt+1, yt+1). The next theorem shows that an
optimal solution to DMLFLT P¯T−1(x1) is achieved with Algorithm 3.2.
Theorem 3.3. For each t = 1, 2, . . . , T − 1, let (u⋆t (xt , yt), v⋆t (xt , yt)) be an optimal solution to the subproblem. Then, for any
t and (xt , yt), {(u⋆t (xt , yt), u⋆t+1(xt+1, yt+1), . . . , u⋆T−1(xT−1, yT−1))} with
xκ,ντ+1 = F κ,ντ (xκ,ντ , uκ,ν,⋆τ ), (3.4)
where τ = t, t + 1, . . . , T − 1, is an NE solution to P¯T−t(xt). In particular, {(u⋆1(x1, y1), u⋆2(x2, y2), . . . , u⋆T−1(xT−1, yT−1))} is
an optimal decision to DMLFLT P¯T−1(x1).
Proof. This proof is similar to that in [5]. We can similarly show it by induction approaches along with contradiction
techniques and the proof in detail is omitted. 
By dynamic programming algorithms the problem is decomposed into a sequence of minimization problems involving
only decision variables of each stage, which are much easier than the original problem. The following example illustrates
this algorithm.
Example 3.4. Consider the following four-player problemwith two stages. Among players, one group including two players
is the leaders and the other is the followers at each stage. The first group includes the first and the second player while the
second group includes the other two players. The decision variables of the players are u1 = (u11, u12) for the first player,
u2 = (u21, u22) for the second player, v1 = (v11, v12) for the third player and v2 = (v21, v22) for the fourth player, respectively.
The state variables of four players are x1, x2, y1 and y2, respectively. The state transition equations are given by
xνt+1 = xνt + uνt , ν = 1, 2, t = 1, 2, yνt+1 = yνt + 2vνt , ν = 1, 2, t = 1, 2.
The cost functions are given by
g13 (x3, y3) = 4x13 + 2x23, g23 (x3, y3) = x13 + 3x23, G13(x3, y3) = y13 − 2y23, G23(x3, y3) = −y13 + 3y23,
and
g1t (xt , yt , ut , vt) = (3− t)(u1t )2 + (u2t )2 − 2u1t x1t , g2t (xt , yt , ut , vt) = (u2t + 1)2 + 1,
G1t (xt , yt , ut , vt) = (9− 4t)(v1t )2 − (v2t )2 − 2v1t y1t , G2t (xt , yt , ut , vt) = (v2t − 1)2 − 2,
for t = 1, 2. The initial states are x11 = 1, x21 = 1, y11 = 1, y21 = 1 and the admissible decisions are unrestricted,
i.e.,Π1t (x
1
t ) = R andΠ2t (x2t ) = R for t = 1, 2.Π3t (y1t ) = R andΠ4t (y2t ) = R for t = 1, 2.
Let us apply Algorithm 3.2 to this example. Let
V 1,10 (x3, y3) = 4x13 + 2x23, V 1,20 (x3, y3) = x13 + 3x23, V 2,10 (x3, y3) = y13 − 2y23, V 2,20 (x3, y3) = −y13 + 3y23.
At the first step, the following problem, which corresponds to (3.2) with t = 2, is considered, where the second group
including the third and the fourth player acts as the leader at this stage:
min
v12
y12 + 2v12 − 2y22 − 4v22 + G12
s.t. u12 ∈ argmin{4(x12 + u12)+ 2(x22 + u22)+ g12 },
u22 ∈ argmin{x12 + u12 + 3(x22 + u22)+ g22 },
min
v22
−y12 − 2v12 + 3y22 + 6v22 + G22
s.t. u12 ∈ argmin{4(x12 + u12)+ 2(x22 + u22)+ g12 },
u22 ∈ argmin{x12 + u12 + 3(x22 + u22)+ g22 }.
The solution to this problem is u12 = x12 − 2, u22 = − 52 and v12 = y12 − 1, v22 = −2. Moreover, we have
Vˆ 1,11 (x2, y2, v2) = −(x12)2 + 8x12 + 2x22 −
11
4
, Vˆ 1,21 (x2, y2, v2) = 2x12 + 3x22 −
25
4
,
V 2,11 (x2, y2) = −(y12 − 1)2 + y12 − 2y22 + 4, V 2,21 (x2, y2) = −3y12 + 3y22 − 3,
V 1,11 (x2, y2) = −(x12)2 + 8x12 + 2x22 −
11
4
, V 1,21 (x2, y2) = 2x12 + 3x22 −
25
4
.
The final step is to consider the problem, which corresponds to (3.2) with t = 1, where the first group including the first
player and the second player acts as the leader at this stage.
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min
u12
−(x11 + u11)2 + 8x11 + 8u11 + 2x21 + 2u21 −
11
4
+ g11
s.t. v11 ∈ argmin{−(y11 + 2v11 − 1)2 + y11 + 2v11 − 2y21 − 4v21 + 4+ G11},
v21 ∈ argmin{−3y11 − 6v11 + 3y21 + 6v21 − 3+ G21},
min
u22
2x11 + 2u11 + 3x21 + 3u21 −
25
4
+ g21
s.t. v11 ∈ argmin{−(y11 + 2v11 − 1)2 + y11 + 2v11 − 2y21 − 4v21 + 4+ G11},
v21 ∈ argmin{−3y11 − 6v11 + 3y21 + 6v21 − 3+ G21}.
The solution of this problem is u11 = 2x11 − 4, u21 = − 52 and v11 = −3+ 3y11, v21 = −2. Furthermore, we have
Vˆ 2,12 (x1, y1, u1) = 3y11 − 2y21 − (y11)2 − (3y11 − 3)2 + 7, Vˆ 2,22 (x1, y1, u1) = −21y11 + 3y21 + 10,
V 1,12 (x1, y1) = −(x11)2 − (2x11 − 4)2 + 8x11 + 2x21 −
3
2
, V 1,22 (x1, y1) = 6x11 + 3x21 −
37
2
,
V 2,12 (x1, y1) = 3y11 − 2y21 − (y11)2 − (3y11 − 3)2 + 7, V 2,22 (x1, y1) = −21y11 + 3y21 + 10.
Therefore, the optimal decisions are u1 = (u11, u12) = (−2,−3), u2 = (u21, u22) = (− 52 ,− 52 ), v1 = (v11, v12) = (0, 0),
v2 = (v21, v22) = (−2,−2) with the corresponding states x1 = (x11, x12, x13) = (1,−1,−4), x2 = (x21, x22, x23) = (1,− 32 ,−4)
and y1 = (y11, y12, y13) = (1, 1, 1), y2 = (y21, y22, y23) = (1,−3,−7). The optimal values to the four players are 72 ,− 192 , 7 and−8, respectively.
4. Concluding remarks
This paper initially proposes a DMLFLT game and dynamic programming algorithms are extended to solve this model.
DMLFLT games have extremely extensive applications in economics [8]. As an infant research field, it is very interesting to
further explore multi-leader–follower games with unfixed leaders. There are many other challenging issues about DMLFLT.
We just focus on DMLFLT problems under feedback information structure and DMLFLT problems under other information
structures seem to be an attractive topic both in theory and in applications.
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